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  This paper derives a two-tier supply chain model with 
many firms in each tier. The upstream firms engage in 
cost-reducing R&D activities. Under the case of R&D 
competition, the paper discusses how the changes in 
R&D spillover, R&D efficiency and the numbers of the 
manufacturers and the suppliers affect the R&D 
expenditures, the quantities and the profits. Then, R&D 
cooperation is considered. And what effects arise with the 
changes in the R&D spillover and the degree of 
cooperation are studied. 
Key words: supply chain, upstream firm, downstream 
firm, R&D competition, R&D cooperation 
 
1. Introduction 
  The subject of R&D competition and cooperation has 
gained a lot of attention from researchers in a variety of 
settings. Such literature usually uses a two-stage game 
that firms choose their R&D expenditures before making 
decisions on production. [1] examines the impact of 
multinational presence on domestic firms’ innovative 
efforts in a model focusing on the strategic dimension of 
R&D. [2] addresses the question about the optimal degree 
of spillovers and the number of rival firms necessary for 
obtaining the maximum amount of effective R&D. Both 
[1] and [2] only consider R&D competition between 
firms. Meanwhile, many papers consider R&D 
competition and cooperation simultaneously and make 
comparisons between them. [3] presents an interesting 
analysis of cooperative and non-cooperative R&D and 
compares the R&D investment and output under 
cooperative R&D with those under non-cooperative R&D. 
[4] extends the results in [3] to the case of more than two 
firms and more general demand and cost assumptions. [5] 
extends the analytical framework in [3] to a two-industry, 
two-firm-per-industry model allowing for R&D spillovers 
to occur within industries as well as between industries. 
[6] compares duopoly outcomes between two alternative 
models of independent R&D and non-cooperative RJVs, 
where there are complementarities between firm-specific 
R&D resources. 
  Besides the two-stage models, some papers introduce 
another stage game before the other games occur. [7] 
derives the non-cooperative, optimal policy towards 
international R&D cooperation. In the model, the 
governments simultaneously announce their R&D 
subsidy rates before the firms choose their R&D 
expenditures and quantities. [8] examines the impact of 
the firms’ mode of foreign expansion on the incentive to 
innovate as well as the effects of R&D activities and 
technological spillovers on the firms’ international 
strategy. [8] considers a two country imperfect 
competition model where the firms face three different 
type of decisions: how to expand abroad, how much to 
spend on R&D and how much to sell in each market. 
  Although there exist a lot of papers about R&D 
competition and cooperation, we can hardly find one 
under the case of supply chain. An exception may be [9] 
which derives a model that an integrated firm produces 
the input and engages in R&D to reduce the input 
production cost. The integrated firm sells the input to its 
rival at a regulated price and competes with it in the final 
product market. [9] examines input price regulation’s 
effects on R&D and output. In our paper, we consider a 
two-tier supply chain with many firms in each tier. The 
upstream firms, the suppliers, conduct R&D activities 
that result in reduction in marginal cost. We use a 
parameter β  to capture R&D spillovers between the 
suppliers.1 We first consider R&D competition and then 
R&D cooperation. Concerning R&D competition, we 
discuss how the changes in R&D spillover, R&D 
efficiency and the numbers of the manufacturers and the 
suppliers affect the R&D expenditures, the quantities and 
the profits. Under R&D cooperation, we study what 
effects arise with the changes in the R&D spillover and 
the degree of cooperation. 
  The two-tier-supply-chain structure with many firms in 
each tier in the paper is similar to that of [10]. Such kind 
of structure also appears in [11] and [12]. [10] examines 
the impact of fixed and variable costs on the structure and 
competitiveness. [11] examines vertical integration as an 
equilibrium phenomenon and consider the issue of 
private profitability versus collective profitability. [12] 
analyses the effects of different institutional arrangements 
of union-firm bargaining. 
 
2. The Model 
  Consider a two-tier supply chain with 1n  firms, the 
manufacturers, in the downstream tier, and 2n  firms, the 
suppliers, in the upstream tier. The firms in the same tier 
engage in Cournot competition. The suppliers sell a 
homogeneous input at price 2p  to the manufacturers 
which use it to produce a final product. Without loss of 
generality, we assume that one unit of final product 
requires one unit of input. The inverse demand function 
of the final product is 11 bQap −= , where 1p  is the 
price and 1Q  is the total output. Denote the output of 








lqQ . The profit of 
a representative manufacturer is 
ii qpvp ,1211,1 )( −−=Π           (1) 
where 1v  is the constant marginal cost of the final 
                                                        
1 The spillovers are often important parameters in the R&D 
literature and almost all the aforementioned papers consider the 
spillovers. [9] ignores the spillovers since only one firm 
conducts R&D activity and it is no need to consider them. It 
should also be noted that the spillover in [7] has the different 
meaning from other papers and ours. [7] uses the spillover 
effect to capture the degree of R&D collaboration while such 
parameters in other papers indicates the involuntary 
technological information leakage. 
product. 
  The suppliers conduct R&D activities that result in 
reduction in marginal cost. Let jx  be the level of R&D 
investment undertaken by supplier j and let jv ,2  denote 
supplier j’s marginal cost. In order to model the 
possibility of imperfect appropriability (i.e., technological 
spillovers between the suppliers), we introduce a 
spillover parameter ]1,0[∈β . This means that the 
magnitude of supplier j’s cost reduction is determined by 
its own technological knowledge and by a fraction β  of 













mjj gxgxvv β         (2) 
where the parameters g and 02v  describe the efficiency 
of the R&D process and the initial marginal production 
cost of the suppliers. The expression jgx  is an R&D 
production function which reflects the existence of 
diminishing return to R&D expenditures and can be seen 
in many papers[3][8][13][14]. The profit of supplier j is 
jjjj xqvp −−= ,2,22,2 )(Π            (3) 
where jq ,2  is supplier j’s output. 
  Now, we consider the decision problem of the 
manufacturers. Manufacturer i chooses its output to 
maximize its profit by taking the other manufacturers’ 
output as given. The first-order condition can be derived 
from (1), which is 
0)( ,1121 =+−−− iqQbpva  
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  In equilibrium, the overall output of the manufacturers 
and the suppliers must be equal. Substituting 2Q  for 
















mqQ  is the overall output of the 
suppliers. Supplier j chooses jq ,2  to maximize its profit. 








nbvva     (6) 
We can get 2n  equations from (6) since j varies from 1 
to 2n . Then, we can, respectively, derive the suppliers’ 
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3. R&D Competition 
  In this section, we first derive the equilibrium when the 
suppliers independently decide R&D expenditures to 
maximize their individual profits. Then we discuss what 
effects arise with changes in some parameters. 

































  (10) 
Supplier j chooses its R&D investment, jx , to maximize 
its profit. The first-order condition is 
[
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We need the following condition 
 ))(1()1)(1( 2221
2
21 ββββ nnngnnnb −++−>++   
(12) 
to ensure that the discussions are practical. 









































































 211,1 bqi == ΠΠ  
  Proposition 1  Each supplier’s R&D expenditure 
increases with R&D efficiency and the number of the 
manufacturers and decreases with the number of the 
suppliers.  













. Thus, the R&D effort of the suppliers 
increases if R&D activities are more efficient or there are 
more manufacturers. 


















    (14) 
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always holds since it is equivalent to 
0)12)(1( 22 ≥−− βn , which is undoubtedly true. 




















 from (14). Thus, each supplier 
invests less in R&D if more firms exist in the upstream 
tier. 
  Proposition 2  (1) For large spillovers ( 5.0≥β ), the 
suppliers reduce their R&D expenditures when the 
spillover increases. (2) We can not unambiguously 
indicate how the R&D investments vary with the 
spillover if 5.0<β . However, the less the numbers of 
the manufacturers and the suppliers, the lower the R&D 
efficiency and the higher the spillover are, the more likely 
that the R&D investments decrease. 
  Proof Partially differentiating (11) with respect to β , 
we have 












β     (16) 
For 5.0≥β , we get 
))(1()1)(1( 2221
2
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 )(  2221 ββ nngn −+≥          (17) 





 from (16) and (17) 
for 5.0≥β .  




x  holds only if 
 )()1)(1( 2221
2
21 ββ nngnnnb −+>++     (18) 
which ensures that the condition in (12) satisfies. (18) can 
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It can be seen that the left-hand side of (19) decreases 
with 1n  while the right-hand side decreases with β  
and increases with g and 2n  if 5.0<β . Hence, if 
5.0<β , the greater β  and the smaller 1n , 2n  and g 
are, the more likely that x decreases with β . 
  Proposition 3  If an increase in the spillover occurs, 
the quantity of each tier and each firm and the profit of 
each manufacturer increases if 5.0<β  and decreases if 
5.0>β . 
  Proof  It is easily to get 





















which leads to Proposition 3 immediately. 
  Proposition 4  (a) Each supplier’s profit decreases 









nβ . (b) It can not 










nβ . However, the greater g, 1n , 
2n  and β−5.0  are, the more likely that the profit 
decreases with β . 
  Proof  Partially differentiating (13) with respect to 
β  leads to 

















  (20) 
The term in the square brackets of the right-hand side of 









nβ . This proves the first 
part of Proposition 4. 









nβ , we can get from (20) that 























































Therefore, the greater g, 1n , 2n  and β−5.0  are, the 
more likely that the profit decreases with β . 
  Proposition 5  The quantity of each tier and each 
supplier increases with 1n . Each incumbent supplier’s 
quantity decreases if new suppliers enter the market, i.e., 
2n  increases. 
































Noting that  
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  Proposition 6  (a) The total quantity of each tier 
increases with 2n  if 5.0=β . (b) It can not generally 
concluded how the number of the suppliers affects the 
quantity of each tier if 5.0≠β . However, the greater 
1n , 2n  and |5.0| β−  are, the more likely that the 
total quantity decreases with 2n . 
































  If 5.0≠β , noting that 
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, we know that the 
greater 1n , 2n  and β−5.0  are, the more likely that 
Q decreases with 2n . 
  Proposition 7  It can not generally concluded how the 
number of the manufacturers affects each incumbent 
manufacturer’s quantity. However, the greater 2n  and 
|5.0| β−  and the smaller g are, the more likely that 
each incumbent manufacturer’s quantity decreases with 
1n . 
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We can not unambiguously indicate the sign of 2ξ  from 
(12) and (21). However, if 








































, we know that the greater 
2n  and β−5.0  and the smaller g are, the more likely 
that 1q  decreases with 1n . 
 
4. R&D Cooperation 
  In this section, we consider the case that the suppliers 
cooperate in R&D and remain competition in production. 











mj ΠλΠ , where ]1,0[∈λ  
captures all possible degrees of R&D cooperation. In the 
extreme case of full cooperation (when 1=λ ), each 
supplier chooses its R&D expenditure level to maximize 
their joint profits. 
  The decisions of the manufactures and suppliers on 
quantities keep the same as R&D competition in Section 
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Supplier j will choose its R&D investment level 



















We can get the first-order condition as the function of 
each supplier’s R&D level from (22) and (23). Since the 
suppliers are identical, the subscript of x can be deleted 





















Then we get 
We need the following condition 
 )]12)(1())[(1(








to ensure that the discussions are practical. 
  Substituting (24) into (7) yields 
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  Proposition 8  The R&D expenditures increases with 
λ , the degree of R&D cooperation. 









  Noting that 0=λ  is actually the case that the 
suppliers do not cooperate in R&D, we know from 
Proposition 8 that the R&D investment level under 
cooperation is higher than that under competition. 
Furthermore, the larger the degree of cooperation is, the 
larger the gap of R&D level between cooperation and 
competition is. The gap reaches the largest value if the 
suppliers engage in full cooperation. 
  Proposition 9  (a) The R&D investments increase 
with the spillover if the degree of cooperation is 
appropriately large, i.e., 5.0≥λ . (b) We can not 
generally indicate how the change in the spillover affects 
the R&D investment if 5.00 << λ . However, the 
greater λ  and g and the smaller 1n  and β  are, the 
more likely that the R&D investments increase with β . 
If 5.0<β , the greater 2n  is, the more likely that the 
R&D investment increases with β . If 5.0>β , the 
smaller 2n  is, the more likely that the R&D investment 
increases with β . 
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(b) If 5.00 << λ , the first and second term on the 
right-hand side of (29) are, respectively, negative and 
positive. Thus, we can not unambiguously indicate the 
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 if 5.0>β . 
  Proposition 10  When the degree of R&D 
cooperation changes, the quantity of each tier and each 
firm increases if 5.0>β , decreases if 5.0<β  and 
remains unchanged if 5.0=β . 













which leads to the proposition immediately. 









nλ , the quantity of 









nλ , the quantity may increase or decrease with 
β . The smaller β  is, the more likely that the quantity 
increases with β . 
  Proof  From (25), (26) and (27), we get 
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(a) If 5.0≥λ , we have 
0)3()1( 224 >−−−≥ nn λξ  
If 5.0<λ , we can obtain 




















, from (30) we get 04 ≥ξ  and the 
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This completes the proof. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  This paper has derived a model with upstream R&D in 
a two-tier supply chain. We considered R&D cooperation 
as well as R&D competition. Under R&D competition, 
we studied how the changes in R&D spillover, R&D 
efficiency and the numbers of the suppliers and the 
manufacturers affect R&D investments, quantities and 
profits. Under R&D cooperation, we showed that how 
R&D investments and quantities change with R&D 
spillover and the degree of R&D cooperation. The main 
results in the paper are given in eleven propositions. 
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